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WHAT IF INDIA DOESN'T MAKE IT
Some year soon India may face a major food crisis in which
the United States of America would have to introduce food rationing
in order to prevent several million Indians from starving to death.
The following considerations apply:
1. The immediate cause of the crisis will probably be a few
years bad weather or possibly a war or civil war - in any case a
temporary phenomenon. Thus it will be possible to see an end to the
immediate crisis. However, one step back in the causal chain will be
India's failure to keep its population and food supply in balance.
2. Some people will say that the U.S. will have a moral
obligation to supply the food. The reasons given will include simple
humanitarianism and equalitarianism (we have it and they don't) and
also reasons based on the proposition that we are guilty of something
- imperialism, neo-colonialism, letting international corporations
exploit people.
Already some people say that the U.S. is guilty for feeding
so much to cattle when more food could be exported if we would live
on grain and soybeans rather than feed them to cattle, hogs, and
poultry. This point of view is not much impressed by arguments that
the U.S. is already doing its share in putting out 40% of world food
exports with only 6% of the world's population.
3. It will be easy to identify policies of the Indian
government and of political groups in India that are responsible for
the crisis. Thus India has managed a war, the development of a
nuclear bomb, internal struggles about what language to speak in what
area of the country, and the symbol of Mrs. Ghandi's Congress Party
is the cow. (India has 180,000,000 cows that produce 600 pounds of
milk products a year whereas the U.S. has 17,000,000 milk cattle that
produce 10,000 pounds of milk products a year apiece). India's
students still mainly want to be lawyers, politicians, and pure
scientists and government officials rather than engineers,
agronomists, or businessmen. Agriculture and population control do
not command the full resources available to the government. However,
these policies are the resultant of the democratic political process
in India, and it is not easy to say that any particular group of
politicians would be better of advocating different policies than it
does.
4. Such a major food crisis may not happen. The Indian
government is putting effort into the food and population problems,
and India's increasing capability for organized effort is evidenced
by the successful war with Pakistan and by the organization of the
production of atomic bombs.
5. Foreign aid has not solved the problem. Some people say
this is because foreign aid has been insufficient and that much more
would do it. Perhaps it would, but it seems unlikely that a great
increase is forthcoming. Understanding of the problem is clouded, it
seems to me, by the tendency of the advocates of increased aid to try
to instigate and capitalize on guilt feeling among the potential
donors. This has created a vague feeling that India's troubles are
somehow the fault of foreign countries.
On the positive side, foreign aid has contributed useful
technology in agriculture, industry, and birth control. Other aid,
such as that to educational institutions has probably been neutral in
its effects on the population-food problem. Almost certainly,
military aid has had negative effects. The major negative effect of
foreign aid has been to postpone the time at which the
population-food problem dominates Indian politics by getting the
government over crises. To the extent that foreign aid has permitted
a perception that foreign governments were responsible for the
situation or for finding a solution, it has had a negative effect.
Anything that allows resources to be expended on increasing the size
of bureaucracy has been negative. The tendency for the bureaucracy
to expand is important in almost all underdeveloped countries,
because getting one's relatives into the bureaucracy may be the only
way to save them from a life of extreme poverty, and in almost all
such countries, family ties are quite strong and family duties much
recognized.
POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A MAJOR FOOD CRISIS
1. The required sacrifices are made by the U.S. and possibly
other advanced countries, but no fundamental changes in India are
made. Then there is a strong possibility that the crisis will recur
in an aggravated form.
2. The advanced countries provide not only the immediately
required food but also technological and financial aid on a much
larger scale than previously. This is the scenario favored by the
Indian government, United Nations officials, and many liberal
thinkers about the problem. As this point of view sees it,
sufficiently generous aid on non-coercive terms is the only way out.
Anything else tends to be unthinkable or at least unthought about. A
failure of an aid program to achieve the desired result would simply
mean that it wasn't big enough. Naturally, United Nations officials
cannot think about any international program that violated the
sovereignty of the recipient country. Indeed, the trend of
international political opinion is in the direction of fewer
restrictions on the way aid is used, and many liberals advocate that
U.S. aid be funneled through the U.N. so that we cannot impose
conditions. This tendency protects the political processes of the
recipient countries from external pressure.
In my opinion, it may turn out that no-strings aid simply
will not be forthcoming in sufficient quantity to prevent starvation.
3. The food crisis triggers civil war. Communists of various
kinds favor civil war as a means of getting power, and the
desperation induced by the crisis may get them soldiers. Once civil
war is started, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that it may
be safer to be in one of the armies than to be a civilian, since the
armies will requisition food for themselves. The actual issue
starting the war may not be the food crisis, but the crisis may make
it more likely that a conflict over some other issue will result in
war. India may be the first country to have a nuclear civil war. If
such a war started, a substantial fraction of the population might
die, because productive facilities would inevitably be destroyed as
well as transportation facilities necessary to bring in what foreign
aid might be available.
4. A military dictatorship may take over. Such a
dictatorship might find its internal political problems simpler than
the present democracy and hence might be able to dedicate a larger
fraction of national resources to the food problem. A communist
dictatorship would also be able to devote major national resources to
the food and population problems. This has happened in China.
5. The food and population issues might acquire sufficient
salience in the minds of politically active Indians that a democratic
government would be formed that would take sufficient measures to
solve the problem. This would be the best possible outcome.
6. Foreign aid might be conditional on certain measures.
This would require a foreign country with both the resources to give
the aid, an